Friday, March 27, 2009

Reax to today's new AfPak policy announcement

The BBC has this roundup of world reaction to Obama's Friday announcement of more troops and new goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

A few to consider ...


PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR TO THE US: "... an extraordinarily positive sign that the Obama administration is thoroughly re-examining its policy toward our region, re-evaluating and re-invigorating our common efforts to contain terrorism and extremism. We have been especially pleased by the new level of consultation and partnership that the administration has demonstrated in producing this new strategy and President Obama's personal engagement at this critical time.

RUSSIAN PRESIDENT DMITRY MEDVEDEV: "... we are ready to participate in the efforts directed at putting things in order, at preventing terrorist attacks. On the other hand, ... it is impossible... to rule Afghanistan from abroad. Afghanistan should find its own path to democracy."

AFGHAN PARLIAMENTARIAN: "Do not focus more on troops because as long as their number increases, humanitarian aid and assistance will be ignored and undermined."



"America's Longest War?" (a note on the Holbrooke quote above)

Richard Holbrooke is the first person I ever heard use the term "AfPak." Holbrooke is now President Obama's special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the time, though, Holbrooke was chairman of the Asia Society. He used "AfPak" in a 5/7/08 speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS is in D.C. I'm not. I heard the speech via the CSIS podcast.

Holbrooke called his speech "Afghanistan: America’s Longest War?"

I have not found a transcript. So the quotes that follow are based on my own (potentially) imperfect transcription. I've checked and double-checked, though.

In the speech, Holbrooke explained his title:

"I would submit to you that the war in Afghanistan, now in its seventh year, will before it's over be the longest war in American history. The longest war currently is, of course, Vietnam. Measured at its maximum, 1961 to 1975: 14 years. I see no likelihood that we can achieve our objectives in a timeframe that would mean that we would be out of Afghanistan in that timeframe. That's a daunting statement with massive political implications and I don't say it with any great joy. But the alternative would be a strategic setback to the United States and the return of the Taliban and al Qaeda to Afghanistan and I think that's an unacceptable outcome to the United States. ... I do not believe it's correct to say we're losing in Afghanistan. But it is absolutely correct to say we're not winning. And in the long run, in this sort of war, if the guerillas don't lose, they end up winning."


Here, from the same speech with a bit more context, is the Holbrooke quote I feature at the very top of AfPak Ignoramus:

"It's no secret to those of you in this room that the situation in Afghanistan is critically important to the United States. Just as important as Iraq. But I don't think it's widely understood exactly what the nature of it is or its connection to the situation in Pakistan. So let me propose to you that there is a theater of operations which I will call for purposes of this discussion AfPak -- Afghanistan, Pakistan. In the western half of AfPak, NATO forces operate and that is the part that gets the attention. In the eastern part across the border, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other areas along that long and complicated border, NATO forces are not able to function, except for the occasional Predator that accidentally strays across the border and accidentally kills some Taliban, we hope, and not some innocent people. But quite seriously, this is an extraordinary theater of operations because the NATO forces can only fight on one side of it and success is not possible unless there's success on both sides of it.

"This (Bush) administration has utterly failed to conceive of it as a single strategic theater. It is part of a massive policy breakdown in this area, which I think is going to require urgent repair by whoever the next president of the United States is. I see no likelihood that this administration has either the time or the understanding of the area to fix it. Even if they did understand it – and they certainly have gotten better recently – there's no time left and there's no time to forge a consensus."
Now that Holbrooke is back in government and advising the president on Afghanistan and Pakistan, it seems worthwhile to remember his May 2008 analysis. It gives us deeper context for understanding the news of the day. Today, in particular. This morning President Obama announced more troops and set a "clear and focused goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”

Why do this now?

A better question might be "why didn't I do this months ago?" For nearly a year now, I've been worried about where things were headed in Afghanistan. Here in the United States, I feared that the fiasco in Iraq had allowed us to slip into wishful notions of Afghanistan as our "good war."

My concerns went past the most obvious one: that America's invasion had yet to result in the capture of bin Laden.

No, my concerns were even more basic. I feared that any war that suffered from such neglect was destined to drift into serious trouble. So I started reading up on Afghanistan. Books, of course. But also newspapers, blogs, and magazines. Even government reports. It was in a 6/18/08 U.S. Government Accountability Office report that I saw a single photo that seemed to corroborate my fears. The report explained the photo like this: "more than 1,500 trucks have been on hand and ready for issue since late 2007, but the Afghan Minister of Interior has delayed distribution of these vehicles until adequate accountability procedures and driver training are established in the target districts."

It was a small thing, but I sensed it was symptomatic of bigger problems.

In hindsight, I should have blogged about the photo back then. I write for Huffington Post and it would have been a simple thing to type something up. But then, as now, Afghanistan daunted me. I felt so ignorant that I didn't even feel qualified to raise questions.

So spring turned to summer and summer turned to fall before I wrote my one post about Afghanistan. During those months, news from Afghanistan made it clear America was not winning its "good war." It was reassuring to see both Barack Obama and John McCain discussing the need to craft a better Afghanistan policy. But, as I read more, I worried the candidates were underestimating the challenge in Afghanistan. I summarized my concerns in an e-mail to a retired U.S. military officer, an expert in counterinsurgency who had helped me come up with an Afghanistan reading list. My e-mail to him included these two paragraphs:

I have to tell you that Afghanistan scares the crap out of me. In crucial ways, it seems like a tougher problem than Iraq. While it's plainly a country that you can find on a map, the place seems to lack any cohesiveness, any homegrown reason to even exist as a single country. I worry about how we can make things work in such a place. I find myself wishing we'd waited very, very patiently for bin Laden & Co. to slip up and taken them out without invading and taking on responsibility for the whole mess of a country.

I hope you are right, that Iraq does hold lessons for Afghanistan. My fear, with troop levels now falling according to schedule in Iraq, is that Afghanistan may offer lessons for Iraq: namely, as the Taliban are showing, that you sometimes can't tell for years whether a routed enemy is actually beaten for good.


That still sums up my basic assessment. I'd like to find reasons to see things differently. If I find those reasons, I'll be documenting them here. The search will be time well spent.

The need to spend time productively is the most immediate reason for starting this blog tonight. I have squandered the last two nights of my life getting drawn into fleeting, trivial sideshows of the American political scene. The result was this and this -- neither of which you should bother to click on, precisely because they deal with fleeting, trivial nonsense. This blog is partly a check against getting diverted by the fluff of politics. The reminder that I am out in the world proclaiming myself to be an "AfPak Ignoramus" will hopefully steer me back to picking up a book or listening to a lecture or maybe eventually to trying to learn Pashto or Urdu or some other language that would deepen my understanding.

Thank you for reading. I hope to make it worth your time.